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There are few pressing social issues that
depend as heavily on scientiﬁc information as
do environmental problems. Most scientists
and policy makers agree on the importance of
science in environmental policy debates, even
when they can agree on almost nothing else
about the health of the ecosphere. Thus, envi-
ronmental scientists play a key role in society’s
responses to environmental problems, and
many of the studies performed by environ-
mental scientists are intended ultimately to
affect policy. The precautionary principle has
been proposed as a new guideline in making
environmental policy (1,2). In this paper we
examine the implications of the precautionary
principle for environmental scientists. Speciﬁc
objectives are to deﬁne the precautionary prin-
ciple and illustrate it through three brief exam-
ples; identify aspects of conventional science
that may inhibit precautionary policies; iden-
tify new directions for scientiﬁc research that
would better inform precautionary policies;
and promote dialogue among environmental
scientists about the usefulness and potential
applications of the precautionary principle.
Deﬁnition of the
Precautionary Principle
A 1998 consensus statement characterized
the precautionary principle this way: “when
an activity raises threats of harm to human
health or the environment, precautionary
measures should be taken even if some cause
and effect relationships are not fully estab-
lished scientiﬁcally” (3). The statement went
on to list four central components of the
principle: taking preventive action in the
face of uncertainty; shifting the burden of
proof to the proponents of an activity;
exploring a wide range of alternatives to pos-
sibly harmful actions; and increasing public
participation in decision making.
The term “precautionary principle”
came into English as a translation of the
German word Vorsorgeprinzip. An alterna-
tive translation might have been “foresight
principle,” which has the advantage of
emphasizing anticipatory action—a posi-
tive, active idea rather than precaution,
which to many sounds reactive and even
negative. Although the principle has its
roots in German environmental policy, over
the past 20 years it has served as a central
element in international environmental
treaties addressing North Sea pollution,
ozone-depleting chemicals, ﬁsheries, climate
change, and sustainable development (3).
Precaution is one of the guiding principles
of environmental laws in the European
Union. 
The Precautionary Principle in
Practice
Historical Links
The precautionary principle encourages poli-
cies that protect human health and the envi-
ronment in the face of uncertain risks. In this
broad sense it is not a new concept, and some
may object to giving it a new name, when
similar ideas go by different names in other
disciplines. For example, public health practi-
tioners use the term primary prevention to
mean much the same thing. The physician’s
obligation to ﬁrst do no harm is a precaution-
ary approach to treating a sick person. The
governments of several Scandinavian coun-
tries have made regulatory decisions about
electromagnetic ﬁelds and other hazards using
a concept called prudent avoidance, which is
also similar (4,5). The term precautionary
principle has the advantage that it provides an
overarching framework that links environ-
mental sciences and public health.
Motivating Factors
The precautionary principle has arisen
because of the perception that the pace of
efforts to combat problems such as climate
change, ecosystem degradation, and resource
depletion is too slow and that environmental
and health problems continue to grow more
rapidly than society’s ability to identify and
correct them. In addition, the potential for
catastrophic effects on global ecologic sys-
tems has weakened confidence in the abili-
ties of environmental science and policy to
identify and control hazards. There are also
the apparent contradictions of our regulatory
process: if the laws governing toxic chemical
Address correspondence to D. Kriebel, Lowell
Center for Sustainable Production, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, 1 University Avenue, Lowell,
MA 01854 USA. Telephone: (978) 934-3250. Fax:
(978) 452-5711. E-mail: David_Kriebel@uml.edu
We thank C. Crumbley for her assistance with
this project. 
This work was supported in part by grants from
the John Merck Fund, the Jessie B. Cox Charitable
Trust, the New York Community Trust, the V.
Kann Rasmussen Foundation, and the Mitchell
Kapor Foundation. 
Received 12 February 2001; accepted 28
February 2001.
Environmental scientists play a key role in society’s responses to environmental problems, and many
of the studies they perform are intended ultimately to affect policy. The precautionary principle, pro-
posed as a new guideline in environmental decision making, has four central components: taking pre-
ventive action in the face of uncertainty; shifting the burden of proof to the proponents of an activity;
exploring a wide range of alternatives to possibly harmful actions; and increasing public participation
in decision making. In this paper we examine the implications of the precautionary principle for envi-
ronmental scientists, whose work often involves studying highly complex, poorly understood systems,
while at the same time facing conﬂicting pressures from those who seek to balance economic growth
and environmental protection. In this complicated and contested terrain, it is useful to examine the
methodologies of science and to consider ways that, without compromising integrity and objectivity,
research can be more or less helpful to those who would act with precaution. We argue that a shift to
more precautionary policies creates opportunities and challenges for scientists to think differently
about the ways they conduct studies and communicate results. There is a complicated feedback rela-
tion between the discoveries of science and the setting of policy. While maintaining their objectivity
and focus on understanding the world, environmental scientists should be aware of the policy uses of
their work and of their social responsibility to do science that protects human health and the environ-
ment. The precautionary principle highlights this tight, challenging linkage between science and pol-
icy. Key words: environmental science, foresight, planning, precaution, risk assessment, science policy.
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Commentariesrelease are effective, then why are mercury
levels in freshwater ﬁsh so high that pregnant
women should not eat them (6,7)? How is it
possible that human breast milk may not
meet U.S. Food and Drug Administration
contaminant limits for baby food (8,9)? 
The great complexity, uncertainty, and
potential for catastrophe from global climate
change are among the strongest motivators
for those urging precaution in environmental
policy. The earth warmed over the twentieth
century by an estimated 0.6°C (10). The
trend was not uniform, though, and warming
is occurring faster during the winter and at
night (11), and the winter warming is occur-
ring faster at high latitudes than near the
tropics (12). For human populations, the
rates of change and wide swings in weather
are of chief concern, as ice core records indi-
cate that increased climatic variability may be
associated with rapid climate change events
and changes in the ocean thermohaline circu-
lation (13). Together, warming and more
extreme weather have begun to alter marine
life and the weather patterns that affect infec-
tious diseases, their vectors, and hosts. The
unprecedented scale of this hazard justifies
reexamination of environmental monitoring
systems and paradigms (14).
Frustration with policy concerning toxic
chemicals has also stimulated interest in the
precautionary principle. The risk assessment
process is perceived by a growing segment of
the population as antagonistic to strong envi-
ronmental protection and as excessively com-
plex and full of hidden assumptions that have
the effect of disenfranchising all but the
experts from the decision-making process.
Current U.S. environmental policy often
seems to be more reactionary than precau-
tionary, requiring a high degree of certainty of
harm before preventive action is taken, and
emphasizing the management of risks rather
than their prevention. The precautionary
principle, by calling for preventive action even
when there is uncertainty, by placing the onus
on those who create the hazard, and by
emphasizing alternatives and democracy, is
viewed by environmentalists as a way to shift
the terms of the debate and stimulate change.
Points of opposition. A lively debate is
now underway about the usefulness of the
precautionary principle (15–20). Perhaps the
most frequently voiced criticisms are a) cur-
rent regulatory procedures are already precau-
tionary; for example, the safety factors used in
risk assessments insure precaution; b) the pre-
cautionary principle is not scientifically
sound because it advocates making decisions
without adequate scientiﬁc justiﬁcation; and
c) if it were implemented, the precautionary
principle would stiﬂe innovation by requiring
proof of safety before new technologies could
be introduced. Each of these concerns has
been addressed by proponents of the principle
(21–23), and this article is not intended as a
comprehensive response to critics. The objec-
tive instead is to discuss the implications of
the precautionary principle for the work of
environmental scientists.
Case Illustrations
Cellular telephones in airplanes. When the
flight attendant explains the safety proce-
dures before takeoff, there is an instruction
not to use various electronic devices during
takeoff and landing and not to use cellular
telephones any time during flight. There is
some very limited (anecdotal) evidence that
these devices may interfere with the essential
navigational and control systems of the air-
craft. In 1999, in response to inquiries about
the necessity of this ban, the U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) commis-
sioned a study to gather stronger evidence for
or against the hypothesis that consumer elec-
tronic devices interfere with aircraft functions
(24). The study failed to ﬁnd any evidence of
this interference. Nevertheless, the FAA ruled
that, in the absence of strong evidence of
safety, the ban would continue in effect.
Most people agree that the inconvenience of
not being able to talk on the phone in ﬂight
is offset by even a small risk of an airplane
crash. This illustrates the ﬁrst component of
the principle: taking action in the face of
uncertainty. The second aspect of precaution
deals with burdens of proof, and here, too,
there would probably be little controversy.
Most would agree that those who would
change the rule on cellular telephone use in
ﬂight should have the responsibility to show
that the change will not cause unreasonable
risk. But suppose concerns about portable
electronic devices in airplanes had not been
raised initially, and so airline passengers were
currently using their cellular telephones in
ﬂight. Now suppose that a few isolated mal-
functions occurred in the navigational systems
of a small number of aircraft while cellular
telephones were in use, and concerns were
raised. Should cell phone use be banned? At
that point there would be a quantiﬁable eco-
nomic loss from ending the practice. It seems
quite likely that implicitly or explicitly a
cost–beneﬁt analysis would be run, and to do
this, it would be necessary to estimate the
risk—something that would be, and is, very
hard to do with any conﬁdence. Some might
call this approach more “science based,” but it
would be a highly uncertain process, and one
in which the risks being evaluated might be
very small, but the consequences potentially
catastrophic. Fortunately, the way events have
actually unfolded, it is not necessary to esti-
mate the risk—precautionary action was
taken. The availability of an economically
viable alternative (in-ﬂight telephones) may
have made it easier to act in the absence of
strong evidence, which highlights the poten-
tial for the precautionary principle to stimu-
late the search for safer technologies.
Pesticides in schools. Recently the Los
Angeles Uniﬁed School District, the largest
public school system in the United States,
announced a new policy on the use of pesti-
cides in schools (25). The policy states unam-
biguously that pesticides pose risks to the
health of children and the environment, that
they shall be used only after nonchemical
methods have been considered, and that if
there is a choice among pest control meth-
ods, the least harmful one shall be chosen.
There is no mention of balancing risks and
beneﬁts, nor a list of banned substances. The
precautionary principle is a long-term objec-
tive of the policy, according to its authors.
Critics worry that the precautionary principle
will encourage technology choices based on
fear and emotions, rather than on science.
But another interpretation would be that the
Los Angeles Uniﬁed School District is saying
that all pesticides should be assumed to be
hazardous, while acknowledging a great deal
of uncertainty about exactly how hazardous.
The intention to prefer nonchemical meth-
ods and to choose the least toxic method
encourages a search for alternatives, while at
the same time not preventing the use of a
toxic chemical if it is found to be necessary
and irreplaceable. The new policy also
requires consideration of the service or func-
tion that a pesticide provides. For example, a
pesticide being used for aesthetic purposes
may be determined to be less important than
one that serves a hygienic function. The for-
mer may be more readily eliminated than the
latter, if no alternative can be found. 
Polyvinyl chloride toys. Polyvinyl chlo-
ride (PVC) is an extremely versatile material,
made into thousands of products. By adding
varying amounts of a chemical called a plas-
ticizer, the pliability of PVC can be modiﬁed
from hard and brittle to soft and almost
spongy. There is evidence that several of the
plasticizers, members of the phthalate chem-
ical family, are reproductive toxicants in ani-
mals. They may also cause reproductive
toxicity in humans, although this evidence is
quite limited (26–28). Until 1999, many
PVC plastic toys speciﬁcally designed to be
sucked and chewed contained the plasticizer
diisononyl phthalate. Many of the manufac-
turers of toys that formerly contained this
chemical have now voluntarily stopped
using this plasticizer, or in some instances
completely phased out PVC in these toys,
in response to consumer and government
concerns about toy safety. But the evidence
for human health risks is weak and uncer-
tain. Producers of PVC products have
argued that there is no evidence of harm
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from use of their products, given 40 years of
use without apparent ill effects. 
There is a flaw in this reasoning, how-
ever, because the absence of evidence of
harm is not the same thing as evidence of the
absence of harm. Of course, absolute safety
can never be proven. But a lengthy and
costly risk assessment, followed by an equally
lengthy and acrimonious risk management
process would be the likely outcome of the
present one-substance-at-a-time approach to
chemicals policy. 
The precautionary principle seeks to min-
imize the limitations of a risk assessment-
based regulatory policy by encouraging a
search for alternatives whenever a potentially
hazardous chemical is identiﬁed. If a clearly
safer alternative exists, why accept even a
small, highly uncertain risk? The Danish
Environment Agency used just this logic in
taking action to eliminate phthalates from
toys (29). They said, in essence, that there is
exposure to these compounds, there is animal
toxicity data, the exposure is to children who
by definition are particularly susceptible to
many toxic substances, there are alternatives,
and the product serves no necessary function.
Considering all these factors, they concluded
that the plasticizer should not be used in toys.
Limitations of Conventional
Scientiﬁc Methods 
Environmental scientists study highly com-
plex, poorly understood systems. Often the
most informative experiments cannot be
conducted for logistical or ethical reasons
(there is only one Atlantic Ocean to study;
potential carcinogens cannot be adminis-
tered to humans in double-blind trials). At
the same time, this work is of great interest
to those who seek to balance economic
growth and environmental protection. In
this complicated and contested terrain, it is
useful to examine the methodologies of sci-
ence and to consider ways that, without
compromising integrity and objectivity,
research can be more or less helpful to those
who would act with precaution. It would,
for example, be useful to policy makers if sci-
entists were more explicit about the limits of
knowledge and about the nature and
amount of uncertainty in research ﬁndings. 
Presented below are examples of the
ways that science is currently conducted that
may make it more difﬁcult to set precaution-
ary policies. There may be alternatives to
these methods, well within the bounds of
good practice, that would be more helpful to
policy makers faced with high-stakes deci-
sions and great scientiﬁc uncertainty.
Hypothesis Formulation
Einstein said that the theory decides what
can be observed, and at the more practical
level, the formulation of specific research
hypotheses determines to a large degree the
sorts of results that can be found. Where does
the particular formulation of a hypothesis
come from? Often the hypothesis is formu-
lated in a way that is feasible to test with the
time and resources available. There is also a
tendency for researchers to reﬁne understand-
ing of old problems rather than risk investi-
gating new ones (30). Greater and greater
levels of detail are sought about well-deﬁned
problems, rather than the higher stakes enter-
prise of searching for entirely new phenom-
ena. For example, we reﬁne understanding of
the mechanisms of toxicity of asbestos, lead,
and polychlorinated biphenyls, rather than
evaluating effects of other, less well-studied
toxicants. Funding agencies and skeptical
peer reviewers reinforce this tendency by
favoring tightly focused proposals that repeat
or incrementally build upon work in well-
established areas.
Emphasis on Independent Effects,
Not Interactions
There is a tendency to assume that the
mechanisms underlying the phenomena
being studied are driven primarily by the
independent actions of a few causal factors.
If they interact, this is assumed to be of sec-
ondary importance. This implicitly assumes
that things are not connected and leads to an
atomized worldview. In reality, complex bio-
logical systems such as ecosystems, human
populations, or individual physiology are
composed of feedback loops and other inter-
actions which make cause–effect relation-
ships far from direct or linear. But many
times the effects of hypothesized causal fac-
tors are considered in research to be decom-
posable into additive components that are
measured individually. For example, when
studying a mixture of pollutants, the empha-
sis is on identifying which component of the
mixture is problematic. Interactions are difﬁ-
cult to study, but this should be seen as a
challenge to develop more sensitive and
complex methods, rather than as an inherent
limitation of science.
Narrow Deﬁnition of Uncertainty
The formal evaluation of error or uncertainty
in many environmental science papers is lim-
ited to a presentation of p-values or confi-
dence intervals for the main results. Beyond
this, there may be a qualitative examination of
limitations of the ﬁndings, which is relegated
to the discussion section at the end of the
paper. The standard p-values and conﬁdence
intervals indicate the magnitude of potential
error in the statistical parameter estimates due
strictly to sampling variability. But in observa-
tional studies of complex, poorly understood
systems, this may be the least important
source of uncertainty. Potentially more
important are errors in the independent vari-
ables, errors arising from choice of the wrong
form for the model(s) used to analyze and
interpret the data, and biases from problems
in the conduct of the study. 
For example, a study of the effects of an
environmental contaminant on reproductive
success in fish would typically report the
amount of sampling error around the final
estimate of the degree of association found
between the contaminant and the measure of
reproductive behavior. But this would typi-
cally not take into consideration the error in
measuring the levels of the contaminant in
the ﬁsh or in the environment and would not
investigate the sensitivity of the findings to
the choice of statistical models used to link
exposure with reproductive outcome.
It is sometimes argued that scientists are
trained to read papers critically and that they
are able to factor in these other sources of
uncertainty in their evaluation of a study.
But applied scientists are also communicating
to nonscientists who may mistakenly take the
limited characterization of sampling error as
the best estimate of all the uncertainty. 
Setting Type I and Type II Error Rates
Errors due to sampling variability are rou-
tinely quantiﬁed. However, standard practice
has led to a conservatism that perhaps hinders
precautionary action. When a scientiﬁc inves-
tigation is designed to test a hypothesis, there
are two kinds of errors that one seeks to mini-
mize. A Type I error is the mistake of con-
cluding that a phenomenon or association
exists when in truth it does not. (Technically,
the Type I error is rejecting the null hypothe-
sis when it is really true. The paraphrasing
above, while valiantly railed against by statis-
tics teachers everywhere, is the way it is
thought of in everyday practice.) By conven-
tion, Type I (or alpha) errors are guarded
against by setting that error rate low, usually
at 5%. In other words, the ﬁnding must be so
strong that there is less than a 5% probability
that this result would have been seen by
chance alone in a world in which no such
phenomenon actually exists. In this case the
result is called statistically signiﬁcant (with the
clear implication that one is supposed to
believe it). The Type II error, failing to detect
something that actually does exist, is, by con-
vention, often set at 20% (although practical
limitations of sample size often result in a
substantially higher or lower Type II error).
Twenty percent of the time, a real phenome-
non will be missed because the data were not
strong enough to convincingly demonstrate
its existence. There is an implicit bias here:
the test is set up to be more cautious about
falsely detecting something than about failing
to detect something. Should Type I and Type
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II error rates be set explicitly and a priori,
depending on the purposes that the study is
meant to serve? Bayesian statistical methods
promise a way out of these conundrums by
shifting the focus from formal testing to cal-
culating the weight of evidence provided by a
particular study and the degree to which this
study should shift a priori beliefs. At present,
Bayesian methods are little used in practice,
but research to make them more accessible
and practical is now under way (31–33).
Type III Errors
A Type III error occurs when one provides
an accurate answer to the wrong problem
(34). The cliche about looking under the
street light for the keys lost down the block
(because the light is better there) comes to
mind to illustrate this common problem. To
some degree, this is another aspect of hypoth-
esis formulation discussed above. Citizen
groups who ask a scientist for help with a
particular environmental concern frequently
experience the consequence of Type III
errors. The citizens have a broad concern
about, for example, potential health effects of
a power plant in the neighborhood. The sci-
entist hears the concern, and translates it into
a problem that he or she is able to solve with
the tools at hand, such as, do the power plant
emissions exceed current health standards?
This translation almost inevitably narrows
the focus to something manageable and solv-
able. But often the citizens are frustrated with
the results because scientitsts did not ade-
quately address the initial concerns. On the
other hand, the scientist is puzzled or, worse,
concludes that the citizens are “antiscience.”
Disciplinary Divisions 
The citizens group’s concerns about the
power plant would probably be better
addressed by an interdisciplinary investiga-
tion, using a wide variety of different methods
and looking for an integrated understanding
of the facility’s impacts. Traditional bound-
aries between academic disciplines make it
difﬁcult to bring together the broadest possi-
ble set of research tools; combining for exam-
ple quantitative and qualitative methods.
Scientiﬁc Methods to Inform
Precautionary Policy
As noted at the beginning of this paper, sci-
ence plays a critical role in environmental pol-
icy by providing insights into the normal
functioning of natural systems and the ways
they are disrupted by technologies and other
human activities. Environmental scientists use
a wide variety of methods, and these are to a
large degree determined by the problem at
hand. In some ﬁelds, prediction is an essential
part of scientiﬁc proof. In others, it is useless
or impractical. The simple accumulation of
confirming cases is of no use in fields that
hold to a high standard of mathematical
proof, and in some disciplines controlled
experiments are essential. But in many envi-
ronmental sciences where observational stud-
ies are the rule, experiments are often
infeasible or unethical, and it is impractical
to wait to see if predictions are borne out.
Other types of evidence are used, and usually
sufficient proof for action comes from the
accumulation of plausible inference from
independent lines of work. For instance,
environmental causes of cancer may be iden-
tified from the geographic distributions of
cancers; time trends in cancer frequency; the
occurrence of cancers in highly exposed
working populations; animal experiments;
and experimental knowledge of chemical
pathways of cancer induction. And once it is
demonstrated that a particular molecule is
carcinogenic, similar molecules are at least
suspect. Any one line of argument is imper-
fect, and fault can be found with the details
of most separate methods. It is the prepon-
derance of evidence that ﬁnally prevails. It is
never easy to determine the moment in this
process when there is sufficient evidence to
act as if a causal connection exists, but scien-
tists can and should play an important role
in this decision, as they are the ones who
know the data and the methods best. 
A shift to more precautionary policies cre-
ates opportunities and challenges for scientists
to think differently about the way they con-
duct studies and communicate results. The
following paragraphs brieﬂy summarize some
of the positive implications that such a policy
shift might have for the conduct of science.
What Is Studied
There is a great need for better methods to
study whole systems and the interactions of
various causal factors. The cumulative and
interactive effects of multiple insults on an
organism or ecosystem are very difficult to
study. There are often many levels of a system
(individuals, families, communities, nations),
and hazards often exert effects at multiple lev-
els. Current methods in many disciplines are
not well suited to such investigations. 
As noted above, multidisciplinary teams
will be more likely to ﬁnd new ways to frame
hypotheses that lead to insights not possible
from narrow disciplinary viewpoints. The
recent recognition of the problem of
endocrine disruption provides an example. A
review of many different types of evidence on
the effects of persistent pollutants on wildlife
in the Great Lakes led to the hypothesis that
a common mechanism of action might be
causing a variety of reproductive and
developmental effects (35,36). Because of the
fragmentation of scientiﬁc disciplines, no sin-
gle researcher was able to develop a coherent
hypothesis. An interdisciplinary conference
(35) provided the opportunity for many dif-
ferent ﬁelds to meet and share insights. The
conference organizers summarized the out-
come (35): 
so shocking was this revelation [about the wide-
spread observation of endocrine disruption in
wildlife] that no scientist could have expressed
the idea using only the data from his or her disci-
pline alone without losing the respect of his or
her peers. 
Research Methods 
Uncertainty is a positive aspect of knowledge
because it clarifies what is known and
unknown and thus stimulates further inves-
tigation. But there is also a strong desire on
the part of scientists to be precise. This may
result from a confusion of uncertainty of
information with quality of information; but
the two concepts are distinct (37). It is possi-
ble to produce high-quality information
about greatly uncertain phenomena. Most
scientists are aware that their p-values and
conﬁdence intervals do not fully capture all
of the likely error in their results, but stan-
dard methods do not exist for characterizing
other aspects of uncertainty. There is a great
need for research to ﬁnd ways to character-
ize, express, and communicate uncertainty.
Scientists develop intuition or professional
judgment about the strength of a particular
result. The Bayesian view of statistical infer-
ence, an increasingly popular alternative to
standard frequentist methods, acknowledges
that we have beliefs about the phenomena
under study and seeks to formalize the role
these play in the way we view our data (32).
The role of data, according to this perspec-
tive, is to shift our a priori beliefs about the
phenomena under study. Strong results may
shift beliefs a lot, producing a posterior
probability that may be far from the prior
probability that the researcher had assigned
to the hypothesis before conducting the
research. But weak data will have little
impact, leaving posteriors close to priors.
There is increasing awareness that Bayesian
statistical methods correspond more closely
to common approaches to logical inference
in everyday life. Methods development work
is still needed in most ﬁelds, however, before
Bayesian statistics can be routinely applied. 
Uncertainties that derive from the choice
of research methods and mathematical mod-
els should also be more fully investigated and
discussed. Formal sensitivity analyses in
which the investigator assesses the degree to
which results are changed by using different
assumptions or analytic methods should
become standard practice (38).
Current methods seldom encourage a
search for patterns within noisy data and
“clusters of clusters” of similar effects indifferent species. Conservation medicine is a
new academic initiative that links human and
animal health with ecosystem health and
global change (39). It begins from the
premise that the health of ecosystems is
directly related to the health of species,
including humans. The initiative arose from
a growing understanding that human
impacts on ecosystems were multiple and
integrated. Conservation medicine uses inter-
disciplinary teams of veterinary and medical
health professionals to develop a greater
understanding of the ecological context of
health and advance biodiversity conservation
and ecosystem health.
If society chooses to act with incomplete
information, it must be acknowledged that
one kind of risk is being accepted to avoid
another. One risk being accepted is that the
policy choice may have been wrong.
Fortunately, the effects of a policy can often be
evaluated for beneﬁcial or detrimental unin-
tended consequences. Thus a strong environ-
mental monitoring program and formal
evaluations of the interventions or controls are
essential parts of a policy of precaution (40).
Despite the need for more and better sys-
tems research, it remains true that much use-
ful information is learned by taking a system
apart and testing its components. The devel-
opment of new approaches should supple-
ment current scientiﬁc methods, not replace
them. There is also an important role for
those who can synthesize the results of the
work of many disparate disciplines to reach
insights not possible by the individual
researchers. This has been called “joining
edge” research (as opposed to “cutting edge”).
Conclusions and
Recommendations
It is important to clearly distinguish
between the development of scientiﬁc infor-
mation about an issue and the setting of
policy, but in practice, there is not always an
unambiguous demarcation. Policy makers
set agendas that determine the questions
asked of scientists; scientists formulate
hypotheses in ways limited by their tools
and their imaginations; thus, the informa-
tion they provide to the policy makers is
limited and to a degree socially determined.
There is a complicated feedback relation
between the discoveries of science and the
setting of policy. While maintaining their
objectivity and focus on understanding the
world, environmental scientists should be
aware of the policy uses of their work and of
their social responsibility to do science that
protects human health and the environment
(14). The precautionary principle highlights
this tight, problematic linkage between sci-
ence and policy, which can be summarized
in the following seven points:
1.Scientific studies can tell us something
about the costs, risks, and beneﬁts of a pro-
posed action, but there will always be value
judgments that require political decisions.
2. The scientiﬁc data used for making policy
will nearly always be limited by uncer-
tainty. Even the best theory and data will
leave much that is not known about esti-
mates of risks, beneﬁts, or costs. 
3.In conducting their research, scientists
must make assumptions, choices, and
inferences based on professional judgment
and standard practices, that if not known
by the public or policy makers, may make
scientiﬁc results appear to be more certain
and less value laden than is warranted. 
4.Although there are some situations in
which risks clearly exceed beneﬁts no mat-
ter whose values are being considered,
there is usually a large gray area in which
science alone cannot (and should not) be
used to decide policy. 
5. In these gray areas, status quo activities
that potentially threaten human and envi-
ronmental health are often allowed to con-
tinue because the norms of traditional
science demand high confidence in order
to reject null hypotheses, and so detect
harmful effects.
6. This scientiﬁc conservatism is often inter-
preted as favoring the promoters of a
potentially harmful technology or activity
when the science does not produce over-
whelming evidence of harm. 
7.The precautionary principle, then, is
meant to ensure that the public good is
represented in all decisions made under sci-
entiﬁc uncertainty. When there is substan-
tial scientific uncertainty about the risks
and beneﬁts of a proposed activity, policy
decisions should be made in a way that errs
on the side of caution with respect to the
environment and the health of the public.
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